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Abstract 
 Return momentum, a temporal persistence in returns, is a heavily studied topic in the 
financial markets. Gao et al. find that this momentum exists on an intraday level (2014). The first 
half-hour return predicts the last half-hour return to a statistically significant degree, and trading 
on this prediction results in a return above the market return. One proposed explanation for this 
predictive power is the timing of informed traders’ entry into the market at the beginning and end 
of the day. This study evaluates that explanation using an empirical metric to measure the 
amount of informed trading. This measure of informed trading is found to not have a statistical 
impact on the relationship between the first and last half-hour returns. Furthermore, probit 
regression finds that informed trading does not have a statistical impact on predicting just the 
sign of the last half-hour return from the sign first half-hour return. Therefore, the explanation 
that the intraday momentum discovered by Gao, et al. (2014) is due to the market timing of 
informed traders is not supported. Additional study is needed to identify the true cause of this 
intraday momentum. 
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1. Introduction 
 Return momentum, a temporal persistence in asset returns, has been heavily studied in 
financial markets since the work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). It is established that 
momentum exists in different markets and across asset classes (Asness, Moskowitz, Pedersen, 
2013). However, most studies of momentum focus on monthly frequencies, with only a few 
focusing on weekly data (Gao, et al., 2014). At these frequencies, momentum is most often 
explained in a behavioral finance context (Bodie, Kane, Marcus, 2011). These explanations 
assume an investor who is subject to cognitive biases that impact his estimations of expected 
returns. Lower frequency momentum is also explained with the assumption of perfectly rational 
investors in the context of price bubbles (Crombez, 2001). While momentum is studied at higher 
frequencies, such as within one day, for the purposes of determining profitable trading strategies, 
to the best of my knowledge, no theoretical framework explaining the existence of momentum at 
this frequency has been investigated. 
Gao, et al. empirically confirm the observation of intraday momentum (2014). They find 
that the first half-hour return predicts the last half-hour return on the SPDR S&P 500 Index ETF 
(SPY). That is, if the first half-hour return is positive (negative) on a given day, then with a 
significant predictive power, the last (thirteenth) half-hour return is also positive (negative). 
Furthermore, when the sign of the next-to-last half-hour return matches the first, the predictive 
power on the sign of the last half-hour return becomes even greater. 
Gao, et al. (2014) give an explanation for the observed trend1. The explanation has to do 
with the timing of informed traders’ entry into the market. Gao, et al. (2014) explain that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This explanation is actually the second of two explanations given. The first explanation will not be considered in 
this study. It has to do with the behavior of day traders. It states that after the return in the first half-hour of the 
trading day is positive (negative), day traders will go short (long), with an expectation of reversal. If this position 
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informed traders maximize profits by entering the market at the beginning and end of the trading 
day, generally with same good or bad information at both times of a given day. This means they 
open long or short positions (depending on the “sign” of the news) at both times of the day, 
which results in the same sign of returns at both time points. 
 The contribution of this study is to employ microstructure tools to explain the type of 
higher frequency persistence that Gao, et al. find, between the first and last half-hour of a trading 
day. While Gao, et al. identify the momentum between the first and last half-hour returns, the 
authors directly state that their explanation is “limited in scope” and that “future research for 
understanding the economic forces is called for” (Gao, et al., 2014). This study makes its specific 
contribution by empirically evaluating the given explanation. Gao, et al. model last-half hour 
returns as a function of first half-hour returns, while this study explains last half-hour returns 
with both the first-half hour returns and the degree of information asymmetry (which can proxy 
the number of informed traders in the market at a given time), among other controlling factors.  
Information asymmetry is a branch of study into market microstructure, which is how 
exchange occurs in the market between buyers and sellers. To my knowledge, information 
asymmetry has never been applied to momentum studies (the current uses of information 
asymmetry will be discussed in Section 2). This novel application adds to the growing body of 
literature concerned with how market conditions can impact returns on an intraday scale. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
never turns profitable, then the traders will hold until the end of the day, when they will unwind so that they hold no 
position overnight. The buying to cover their short position (selling their long position) will push the price up 
(down) in the last half-hour, which would result in the observed trend. For the first explanation to be correct, the 
reversal strategy mentioned must be successful less than half of the time, or else the reversal position would be 
closed before the last half hour. If the strategy were generally successful, then it would not explain the observed 
trend. However, if the strategy were generally unsuccessful, day traders would not employ it. Therefore, the logic of 
that explanation does not appear consistent, so it will not be considered. 
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details previous research related 
to both momentum and the information asymmetry branch of market microstructures. Section 3 
describes, in detail, the theoretical explanation given by Gao, et al. for the observed intraday 
momentum between the first and last half-hour returns. Sections 4 and 5 describe the empirical 
methodologies that are used to test that explanation. In Section 4, the methods for measuring 
information asymmetry are explained, and in Section 5 the regression models are defined and 
motivated. Section 6 describes the data. Section 7 gives the results of the estimation of the 
models, and describes tests of the robustness of these models. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 The literature review is broken down into two sections. First, prior research concerning 
financial market momentum is discussed, followed by a discussion of prior research regarding 
informed trading and information asymmetry. 
2.1 Momentum 
Gao, et al. observe that positive (negative) returns early in the day are predictive of 
additional positive (negative) returns later in the day (2014). They cast this predictive trend as 
empirical evidence of a type of intraday return momentum. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first 
established that momentum exists in financial market returns. Winners of the past six months 
tend to continue gaining positive returns, while losers tend to continue taking losses.  
Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) find that time-series momentum exists, where 
returns can be positively predicted by previous periods returns. At a monthly frequency, they 
find this momentum effect exists across eight different markets and asset classes (United States, 
 6 
Great Britain, Eurozone, and Japan equity markets; country equity index futures; government 
bonds; currencies; and commodity futures). They create dollar neutral portfolios of all assets in a 
particular class, weighted by total raw asset returns from the previous year. The best past 
performers have positive weights (long positions) and the worst past performers have negative 
weights (short positions). These portfolios have positive returns across asset classes, indicating 
momentum across these asset classes. 
The momentum effect is often explained with psychological explanations (Bodie, Kane, 
and Marcus, 2011). In fact, Jegadeesh and Titman’s original work is motivated by investors’ 
overreactions to information (1993). When making forecasts, people tend to give more weight to 
recent events, called a memory bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; 1973). When determining 
expectations for asset performance, forecasters are biased by most recent returns. Expectations 
for recent winners are biased to be overly optimistic, and those for recent losers are biased to be 
pessimistic. These expectations drive investor decisions to take long or short positions on these 
assets. The long positions will continue to push the price up on recent winners, and shorts will 
have the opposite effect for recent losers. This generates return momentum (Bodie, Kane, and 
Marcus, 2011). This explanation for the momentum effect can be validated by the observation of 
longer-term reversals following shorter-term momentum.  
After periods of momentum, there is often a price reversal. This may be due to the fact 
that momentum is due to forecasting biases, and not the actual asset value. Once the bias is 
revealed (for example, through the release of a lower than expected earnings report for an asset 
that had been experiencing positive momentum) trading in the opposite direction (such as selling 
assets with previously positive momentum) will correct the price to match the true asset value 
(Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2011).  
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The extreme of this effect is observed in market bubbles (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 
2011). The dot-com bubble of the late 1990’s grew as investors saw positive returns in 
technology and were biased to expect further positive returns in the future. During this bubble, 
the technology-heavy NASDAQ index increased by more than a factor of 6. However, when the 
reversal came, it sunk the index to less than one-fourth of its peak by October 2002 (Bodie, 
Kane, and Marcus, 2011). 
As Gao, et al. observe (2014), nearly all studies of momentum are done at a monthly (or 
occasionally weekly) frequency. There has not been a study that has designed a theoretical 
framework to explain momentum at such a frequency. However, technical trading strategies to 
profit off of intraday momentum and reversals are commonly used by high-frequency traders 
(Schulmeister, 2009). 
2.2 Informed Trading and Information Asymmetry 
Research into market microstructures is the study of how buyers and sellers interact in the 
market. One important aspect of microstructures is information dissemination into the market 
and information asymmetry between investors (Easley, et al 1996; Tannous, Wang and Wilson, 
2013). Information dissemination is the process by which market participants learn the correct 
value of an asset. Information asymmetry is the difference in the knowledge of the true value of a 
given asset between market participants. Research shows that information discovery can lead to 
movements in prices and investment opportunities (Tannous, Wang, and Wilson, 2013). The 
theoretically optimal market entry time for an investor is also dependent on the amount of private 
information they possess (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). This is fundamental to Gao, et al.’s 
hypothesized explanation for their observed intraday momentum trend. 
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The degree of informed trading (and by extension, the degree of information asymmetry) 
can be measured empirically. The most widely researched measure of informed trading is the 
PIN (Probability of Informed Trading), developed by Easley, et al. (1996). This model assumes 
that traders enter the market for one of two reasons. First, investors may have better information 
than the market. These informed traders have private information, and are motivated by a profit 
opportunity to enter the market. They will enter the market asymmetrically as buyers and sellers, 
corresponding to the type of information that they have acquired. The other reason for market 
entry is that the investors are trading for liquidity. Their motive for entering the market is not 
directly tied to asset returns, but instead may have to do with liquidity needs or to balance a 
portfolio, for example (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Those trading for liquidity will enter the 
market randomly. This stochastic process, on average, produces equal numbers of buyers and 
sellers, spread evenly throughout the trading day. In essence, the PIN measure (to be 
mathematically defined later) captures asymmetry in the number of buys and sells, which can be 
considered the result of informed traders. This model has since been expanded on to account for 
higher frequency trading (Karyampas and Paiardini, 2011). 
 
3. Theoretical Explanation for Intraday Momentum 
 In this section, the theoretical explanation that Gao, et al. present as an explanation for 
the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the last half-hour return is presented.  A 
series of claims are offered and justified by either intuition or prior research. These are the 
logical steps that Gao, et al. present in their theoretical explanation of the observed intraday 
momentum. From these claims, it can be concluded that first half-hour returns predict last half-
hour returns. 
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Claim 1: Investors are profit maximizing. 
The first claim that investors are profit maximizing is intuitive. They make investments to 
maximize returns now and in the future. 
Claim 2: Informed traders maximize profits by entering the market when the volume is highest. 
 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) create a theoretical framework for the timing of trades for 
both informed and liquidity traders. From this model, they conclude that it is optimal for 
informed traders to time their trades to when volume is highest. By doing so, informed traders 
are able to “hide” their private information from the market, so that the trader can retain their 
information advantage. 
Claim 3: Trading volume is highest at the beginning and end of the trading day. 
Gao, et al. indicate that the validity of this claim is demonstrated in several studies, which 
show that the intraday volume distribution is U-shaped (Jain and Joh, 1988). 
Claim 4: Informed traders will enter the market at the beginning and end of the trading day. 
 By combining the first three claims, Gao, et al. conclude Claim 4 to be true. Informed 
investors, who are profit maximizing, can achieve greatest profits by trading when volume is 
highest, which occurs at the beginning and end of the day. Therefore, informed investors will 
enter the market at these times. Gao, et al. also mention that under a slightly different trader 
preference specification than Admati and Pfleiderer, Hora (2006) shows, in a theoretical 
framework, that an optimal trading strategy for informed traders is to trade heavily at the 
beginning of the day, with less trading during the middle part of the day, and heavy trading again 
at the end of the day.  
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There is the possibility that empirical studies of trading volume and theoretical 
frameworks relating the market entry of informed traders to the trading volume are subject to 
potential endogeneity. First, informed traders may be entering the market due to high volume at 
the beginning and end of the day, and second, volume may be highest at the beginning and end 
of the day due to the market entry of informed traders. Gao, et al. do not resolve this endogeneity 
effect, but it is not troublesome for this study, as informed trading is being studied in relation to 
returns, not to volume. 
Claim 5: Private information does not become fully priced into the market in less than one day 
Gao, et al. make this assumption implicitly in their theoretical explanation. It is justified 
by MacKinlay (1997), who demonstrates that the effect of a release of information is often 
observed over several days. This indicates that the information takes longer than one day to be 
fully priced into the market, or else the effect of an information release would only be observed 
over a short period of time, until the market reflected the information’s full effect.  
Claim 6: Informed traders will have an advantage of the same “sign” at the beginning and end 
of the day. 
The “sign” of private information is whether the information is positive about the asset or 
negative. Claim 6 is a simple extension of Claim 5. If investors have private information at the 
beginning of the day, their information will likely not disseminate into the market during that 
day, so they will still have an information advantage at the end of the day, from the same 
information (with the same “sign”).  
From claims 4 (informed traders enter the market at the beginning and end of the day) 
and 6 (informed traders have an information advantage of the same “sign” at both of these time 
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points), Gao, et al. conclude that informed traders will enter the market at the beginning and end 
of the day either long or short at both times (depending on the “sign” of the private information). 
Informed traders with positive information would buy the given asset at both times that they 
enter the market (or the sell the asset, if the information is negative), since their information will 
be of the same “sign” at both times. The aggregate of this action from many informed traders 
with similar information pushes the asset price up (down) at both the beginning and end of the 
day. This would result in the observed intraday momentum between the first half-hour return and 
the last half-hour return. 
 
4. Empirically Measuring Informed Trading 
 In this section, the models that are commonly used to empirically measure information 
asymmetry (including the one that this study utilizes) are described. The seminal probability of 
informed trading (PIN) model as defined by Easley, et al. (1996) is as follows: 
PIN = ! ∙ !! ∙ ! + !! + !! 
where a is the probability of private information, µ is the arrival rate of orders from informed 
traders, εs is the arrival rate of sell orders from uninformed traders, and εB is the arrival rate of 
buy orders from uninformed traders. The motivation for this model is to estimate the probability 
of making a trade with someone who has better information than you do. Effectively, the 
numerator is the rate of arrival of “informed trades” and the denominator is the arrival rate of all 
trades. The share of informed trades among all trades gives the probability of informed trading. 
This model is estimated by a maximum-likelihood method using multiple initial values for each 
parameter, given the distribution of the arrival of buy and sell orders. 
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 This model is simplified by Karyampas and Paiardini (2011). They observe that the 
arrival rates relative to clock time become less important as trading frequency becomes higher 
and higher. Instead, the arrival rates relative to a “trade clock” are important. Their model does 
not require maximum likelihood estimation, and can be estimated directly from the buy and sell 
orders. This model is called the Volume-synchronized Probability of INformed trading (VPIN), 
and is estimated as follows: 
!"#$ = !!! − !!!!!!! !"  
where there are n volume buckets of volume V, indexed by τ. In each bucket, there is a volume of 
VτS sell orders and a volume of VτB buy orders. The logic of this model is the same as the 
previous PIN model. The numerator is the asymmetry between buyer and seller driven trades, 
which is indicative of the amount of informed trading, and the denominator is the total number of 
trades. The quotient of these two gives the probability of informed trading. This model, the 
VPIN, is used in this study as the empirical measure of informed trading. 
 In this sample, the buckets each have a volume of 250,000 shares traded. This gives an 
average of 50 buckets per day throughout the sample, consistent with the methodology initially 
employed by Karyampas and Paiardini (2011). The mean VPIN in this sample is 0.329, with a 
standard deviation of 0.136 (additional sample statistics in Section 6). 
Buy and sell designations for trades can be assigned using several different methods. The 
simplest, which is used in this study, is the tick test. If the execution price of a trade is greater 
than that of the previous trade, then it is signed a buy, and if it is lower than that of the previous 
trade, it is signed a sell (Karyampas and Paiardini, 2011). A buyer driven trade would have a 
higher price, as the buyer would be willing to pay more for the trade to be executed. A seller 
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driven trade would have a lower price by the opposite logic. The seller would be willing to 
accept a lower price for the sake of the trade being executed. 
 
5. Empirical Methodology 
 In the following section, the empirical models that are used to evaluate the theoretical 
explanation given by Gao, et al. are motivated and developed from the original model created by 
Gao, et al. The model that is tested by Gao et al. (2014) is a simple OLS regression of the last 
half-hour return upon the first half-hour return, using the following model: 
!!",! = ! + !!!,! + !! 
where !!",! and !!,! are the thirteenth (last) and first half-hour returns on day t. 
 In further investigation of the observed predictive trend, Gao et al. find that other factors 
impact the rate of success of the prediction of the last half-hour return with the first half-hour 
return in the context of a trading strategy during the last half-hour based on the first half-hour 
(2014). However, Gao, et al. do not formally test the statistical significance of these factors. 
Therefore, these factors are added first to the model. Among these factors are the first half-hour 
price volatility, business cycle timing (expansion or recession), and whether or not there is an 
economic news release (GDP, CPI, Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes) 
on that day. An additional relevant factor for this model is the effect of asymmetries: a difference 
in effect when returns are positive compared to when returns are negative. With the addition of 
these factors, the model expands to: 
!!",! = !! + !!!!,! + !! !!,! ! + !!!"#! + !!!"#$! + !!!"#$! ∙ !"#!,! + !!!"#!,! + !! 
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 In this model, the term !!,! ! is the square of the first half-hour return on day t to capture 
the first half-hour price volatility.!!"#! is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is currently a 
recession on day t, and equals 0 if that day is during a period of expansion and !"!"! is 
categorical dummy variable that equals 1 if the given news release (GDP, CPI, FOMC meeting 
minutes) occurs on day t, and equals 0 otherwise. Finally !"#!,! is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the first half-hour return is positive, and equals 0 otherwise, to capture the effect of 
asymmetries. The News and Pos terms are crossed to account for the difference in the effect of 
having a news release on a positive market day and on a negative market day. 
Gao, et al. identify informed trading and the market timing of informed trading as a 
source for the explanatory power. However, they do not explore this explicitly. Our contribution 
is to empirically assess this claim. To do so, we also begin with OLS estimation, but we add an 
information asymmetry term and an interaction term between the VPIN term and the first half 
hour return. The motivation for this interaction term is to measure how much the effect of the 
first half-hour return on the last half-hour return is impacted by the degree of informed trading. 
Given these additional factors, the model to estimate expands to: 
!!",! = !! + !!!!,! + !!!"#$!,! + !!!!,! ∙ !"#$!,! + !! !!,! ! + !! !!,! ! ∙ !"#$!,! + !!!"#!+ !!!"#$! + !!!"#$! ∙ !"#!,! + !!!"#!,! + !! 
In this model, !"#$!,! is the first half-hour volume-synchronized probability of informed 
trading. For completeness, the squared returns term is crossed with the VPIN term as well, to 
measure the full effect of informed trading on the relationship between the first and last half hour 
returns. See Section 7 for sources, summary statistics and further explanations for each of these 
variables. 
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In ordinary least squares models such as these, the disturbance terms (!!) are assumed to 
be independently distributed according to a standard Gaussian distribution. Violations to this 
assumption are investigated later in Section 8. 
In this model, the key coefficient of interest is the crossed returns/VPIN term (!!). If the 
theoretical explanation offered by Gao, et al. (2014) is correct, this coefficient ought to be 
significant and positive. This would indicate a positive impact of VPIN on the relationship 
between the first and last half-hour returns. Essentially, testing the significance of this coefficient 
amounts to testing the explanation provided by Gao, et al. 
 
6. Data 
 The intraday price data is gathered from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Trade-
and-Quote (TAQ) database. This database is accessed via the Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). The trade prices are used to calculate first and last half hour returns, as well as to 
assign buyer- or seller-driven designations to each trade. With those designations, the trade data 
will be used to calculate the first half hour VPIN, to be used in the empirical model. The dates 
for news releases will be gathered from the releasing agency (Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and Federal Reserve, for GDP, CPI, and FOMC 
meeting minutes release dates, respectively). 
 Following the precedent of Gao, et al. (2014), the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY) will be the 
asset analyzed. The time period to be studied is January 4, 1999, through December 31, 2012, 
following the precedent of Gao, et al. This is a total of 3521 trading days. Summary statistics are 
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presented in Table 1 (appendix). In addition, return time series and distributions are presented in 
Figures 1-5 (appendix).  
 The first and last half-hour returns are approximately normally distributed around a mean 
of approximately 0%. There is one large outlier in the first half-hour returns, when the SPY lost 
over 8% during the first half-hour of trading of September 17, 2001, which was the first day of 
trading following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The distribution of VPIN is also 
approximately normally distributed, but with a slight skew to the right. These variables do not 
exhibit high correlations among each other (Table 2). 
The news releases occur on fairly regular schedules. The GDP is released quarterly, with 
updates each month that there is not a quarterly release. Therefore, there is a monthly release 
schedule from the BEA. The CPI releases also occur monthly. Finally, there are approximately 
eight releases of FOMC meeting minutes per year, following each meeting. 
 
7. Results 
Gao, et al. (2014) report that their model explains approximately 2% of variation in the 
last half-hour return, which is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. These results 
are confirmed with the current data (Table 3, appendix). This is a confirmation, with the current 
study dataset, of the observed predictive power of the first half-hour return on the last by Gao, et 
al. 
By including the control factors that are mentioned by Gao, et al., but were not tested 
empirically, the explanatory power of the model is increased (R2 increased from 0.0193 to 
0.0247). This increase was statistically significant (F(9, 3461) = 2.12, p = 0.0247), despite only two 
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factors having individually significant coefficients (the squared returns term and the asymmetries 
term). The coefficient on the first half hour return is increased slightly in this model, which 
means that the additional factors enhance the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the 
last (Table 3, appendix). 
 The inclusion of VPIN factors again increase the explanatory power of the model (R2 
increased from 0.0247 to 0.0278). This increase is statistically significant (F(3, 3458) = 3.72, p = 
0.0110). However, in this model, the crossed VPIN and returns term (!!,! ∙ !"#$!,!) is statistically 
significant, but with a negative coefficient (Table 3, appendix). This is in contrast to the 
expectation of a positive, significant coefficient if the theoretical explanation by Gao, et al. is 
correct. However, the robustness of this result must be confirmed before a definitive conclusion 
can be made regarding the accuracy of that explanation. The robustness is checked, below, on the 
dimensions of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, breakpoints in the sample, collinearity, and 
different functional forms. 
 The above models assume independent, Gaussian disturbance terms, but this assumption 
does not always hold for financial data. The potential issues with these assumptions are 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Specifically, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH) is a common attribute of daily asset returns (Bollerslev, 1987). The presence of ARCH 
in this sample is confirmed by an LM test (χ2(df=1) = 602.529, p = 0.0000). To control for these 
violations of the standard Gauss Markov assumptions, a generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model is utilized. To determine how many ARCH and GARCH 
lags are optimal, we calculate Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) for all 
combinations of lags less than 5, and select the model with the lowest AIC and BIC values. This 
model has 3 ARCH lags and 3 GARCH lags. This model does show statistically significant 
 18 
ARCH and GARCH coefficients at the 5% significance level2. In the GARCH model, some of 
the coefficients did change (Table 3, appendix). The coefficient on the crossed return/VPIN term 
is positive in the GARCH model, but is not statistically significant. 
 Another concern regarding the robustness of the results is that the distribution of VPIN 
appears to change around the beginning of the year 2008 (Figure 7, appendix). Particularly, the 
mean VPIN of the sample before this point is 0.397, while the mean VPIN after is 0.207. The 
sample is split at this point and the regression is estimated again for each subsample. In the first 
subsample, the only major change is that the crossed return/VPIN term does not have a 
significant coefficient. In the second subsample, the significance of each coefficient estimate is 
approximately the same as the entire sample (Table 4, appendix). The explanatory power of the 
second subsample is much greater, and the actual coefficient estimates are quite different. This is 
likely due to the Great Recession, which takes up a large portion of this period. 
Gao, et al also develop a trading strategy in their paper to take advantage of their 
predictions (2014). The strategy is to buy or sell short during the last half hour based on the 
return of the first half hour (long if the first half-hour returned positive, and short if the first half-
hour returned negative). For an investor using this trading strategy, a prediction of the exact 
magnitude of the last half hour return may be of less interest than a prediction of a probability 
that the sign of the last half-hour will match the sign of the first (and thus providing a positive 
return to their investment during the last half-hour). 
The probability of a successful prediction of the sign of the last half-hour return, given 
the sign of the first half-hour return can be estimated by probit regression. This model could 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 All other GARCH models tested were found to have statistically significant ARCH and GARCH lags. In each 
other model, the !! coefficient on the crossed return/VPIN term was positive, but statistically insignificant.!
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include each of the factors mediating the prediction of the last half-hour return. Such an 
unrestricted model would be: 
Pr !"! = !! + !!!!,! + !!!"#$!,! + !!!!,! ∙ !"#$!,! + !! !!,! ! + !! !!,! ! ∙ !"#$!,! + !!!"#!+ !!!"#$! + !!!"#!,! + !! 
where !"! is a binary variable that equals 1 if the sign of the first half hour return is the same as 
the sign of the last half hour return, and equals 0 otherwise. This model has a significant 
explanatory power, as the !! statistic has a significant p-value (p = 0.0433). In the estimation of 
this model, the crossed return/VPIN term has negative marginal effects, and is not statistically 
significant (Table 3, appendix). This is further evidence against the theoretical explanation by 
Gao, et al. that the intraday momentum is due to the market timing of informed traders. 
Another possible violation to Gauss-Markov assumptions in the above regressions that 
must be considered is the potential multicollinearity among the regressors. Analysis of 
correlations among regressors indicates that there are none with strong correlations besides the 
correlation between Pos and the first half-hour return (Table 2, appendix). Removal of this factor 
does not drastically change the coefficient estimates, so it is deemed not a concern. Furthermore, 
analysis of variance inflation factors (VIF) indicate that there is not much risk for collinearity 
among regressors as the greatest VIF was 6.22, with a mean VIF of 3.05. 
 Finally, the OLS regressions only consider a linear functional form. Since Gao, et al. 
found that the variability of the first half-hour return was significant for their prediction, we 
hypothesize that a form with threshold effects might fit the data better. Such a model would 
exhibit an increase in the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the last half-hour above 
a given threshold in the first half-hour probability of informed trading or the magnitude of the 
first-half hour return. However, upon further analysis of the data, there are no apparent 
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thresholds above which the predictive power is any stronger. Since no obvious threshold is 
observed, the model was estimated by quintile of VPIN. First, only observations in the second 
quintile or above were considered, then the third or above, etc. In this methodology, the quintiles 
are each used as the thresholds. The estimation coefficients differ in each regression, but in none 
of these five regressions were any of the VPIN term coefficients significant and positive. The 
VPIN and returns crossed term (!!) is positive but not significant in the regression including only 
the observations in or above the second quartile of VPIN (Table 5, appendix). Given these 
results, thresholds are not considered further. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Gao, et al. hypothesize that the first half-hour return predicts the last half-hour return due 
to the timing of the market entry of informed traders. Specifically, these traders enter in the first 
and last half-hours. If this hypothesis is true, then increasing the probability of informed trading 
during the first half-hour should increase the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the 
last half-hour return. The estimation of empirical models explaining the last half-hour return with 
the first half-hour return, the first half-hour probability of informed trading (as measured by 
VPIN), and other factors do not indicate that a greater degree of first half-hour informed trading 
significantly increases the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the last half-hour 
return.  
In the OLS estimation, the effect of VPIN on the predictive power of the first half-hour 
return is in fact significant and negative. This directly violates the theoretical explanation given 
by Gao, et al. (2014). This may be due to the change in the coefficient on the first half-hour 
return from the Gao, et al. model to the current study model. The coefficient on the first half hour 
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return is positive in both models, but much greater in the current study model. The negative 
coefficient on the crossed return and VPIN term may “cancel out” the effect of the increase in the 
return coefficient. This would mean that the VPIN actually does not have a significant impact on 
the relationship between the first and last half-hour returns. 
The inclusion of the ARCH and GARCH lags to control for autocorrelation change the 
value of the !! coefficient on the crossed return/VPIN term from negative to positive. However, 
this coefficient is not statistically significant (in contrast to the expected positive, significant 
coefficient). In addition, the return/VPIN interaction coefficient is negative and statistically 
insignificant in a model only predicting the sign of the last half-hour return. 
According to the theoretical explanation given by Gao, et al. (2014), the predictive power 
of the first half-hour return on the last half-hour return should be positively correlated with the 
first half-hour VPIN. However, in the OLS model to predict the last half-hour return, the 
GARCH(3,3) model to correct for autocorrelation, and the probability model estimating the 
predictive power of the sign of the first half-hour return on just the sign of the last half-hour 
return, this is not the case. Therefore, it can be concluded that probability of informed trading 
does not positively impact the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the last half-hour 
return, and the explanation provided by Gao, et al. (2014) is not supported. 
There are a few limitations to this study that should be noted. The VPIN metric is an 
extension of the PIN model created by Easley, et al. in 1996. Duarte and Young (2009) have 
found that the PIN measure is biased by positive order flow shocks to the number of both buyers 
and sellers, and have created an adjusted PIN measure that corrects these effects. It decomposes 
Easley, et al.’s PIN measure (1996) to two components. The first represents the asset’s 
illiquidity, and the second represents the corrected probability of informed trading. The first 
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component is correlated with asset returns, but Duarte and Young observe no correlation 
between the corrected PIN component and asset returns (2009). Duarte and Young do not test the 
VPIN model, only the PIN, so it is unknown if the VPIN model is biased by the same effect. It is 
reasonable to be concerned that VPIN is a biased estimate of the probability of informed trading. 
In the future, replication of this study using the Duarte and Young adjusted PIN measure 
in the place of VPIN may help to provide a more complete evaluation of the explanation given by 
Gao, et al. for the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the last half-hour return. In 
addition, the Lee-Ready algorithm could be used to assign buy and sell designation to trades 
(Lee, Ready, 1991). Finally, future evaluation of the other untested explanation (see footnote, 
Section 2) is necessary to find a complete explanation for the intraday momentum observed by 
Gao, et al.  
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10. Appendix 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Sample Size Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum !! (%) 3497 0.011 0.740 -8.015 4.430 !!" (%) 3495 -0.003 0.395 -4.134 3.131 
VPIN 3520 0.329 0.136 0.031 0.868 
PS 3521 0.525 0.499 0.000 1.000 !!! 3497 0.547 1.745 0.000 64.233 
 
Notes: In this table, summary statistics are presented for the continuous variables utilized in this 
study. The variables and their sources are defined in Table 6. 
 ! !
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Figure 1. First and Last Half-Hour Returns, over time 
!
 
Notes: This graph shows the return of the SPY during the first half hour of each trading day 
(blue), and the last half-hour of each trading day (red). The two processes appear to mirror each 
other, besides the outlier in the first half-hour return (due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001). 
 
 
 
! !
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Figure 2. First Half-Hour Return, Squared, over time 
!
 
Notes: This graph shows the squared return of SPY during the first half-hour throughout the 
sample period. As above, there is a spike on 9/17/2001, due to the negative trading on this day, 
as it was the first day of trading following the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks.! !
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Figure 3. First Half-Hour Return Distribution 
!!
Notes: The distribution of the first half-hour return is approximately Gaussian, with the mean of 
approximately 0%. ! !
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Figure 4. Last Half-Hour Return Distribution 
!!
Notes: The distribution of the last half-hour return of the SPY is approximately Gaussian, with a 
mean of approximately 0%.! !
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Figure 5. First Half-Hour Return, Squared, Distribution 
!!
Notes: The distribution of the first half-hour return of the SPY, squared, has greatest mass just 
above zero, with an outlier (difficult to visualize here) at approximately 64.  
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Figure 6. First Half-Hour VPIN Distribution 
!!
Notes: The distribution of the first half-hour VPIN is approximately normally distributed, but 
with a slight skew to the right. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!!!!
Table 2. Correlations 
 !! !!" !"#$ !!! !"# !"# !"# !"#$ !"# !! 1.000 - - - - - - - - !!" 0.139 1.000 - - - - - - - !"#$ 0.035 -0.014 1.000 - - - - - - !!! -0.166 0.016 -0.084 1.000 - - - - - !"# -0.071 0.022 -0.179 0.188 1.000 - - - - !"#! 0.022 0.012 0.009 -0.010 -0.004 1.000 - - - !"#! -0.012 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.051 1.000 - - !"#$! 0.012 -0.010 0.004 -0.020 -0.002 0.035 0.028 1.000 - !"#! 0.679 0.066 0.025 -0.028 -0.057 0.010 -0.002 -0.010 1.000 !
Notes: This table lists the correlations between each of the regressors in this study. The variables 
are all defined in Table 6. There are no regressors whose correlations indicate a degree of 
collinearity that is troublesome for the estimation in this study. !! !
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Table 3. Regression Results (p-values in parenthesis) 
 Gao, et al. (2014) Gao Extended OLS with VPIN GARCH(3,3) Pr(PS) 
Constant -0.004 (0.597) 0.016 (0.198) 0.016 (0.459) 0.026 (0.047) 0.534 !! 0.074 (0.000) 0.101 (0.000) 0.152 (0.000) 0.054 (0.002) 0.047 (0.089) 
VPIN - - 0.009 (0.857) -0.059 (0.063) -0.107 (0.117) !! ∙ !"#$ - - -0.189 (0.002) 0.034 (0.496) -0.093 (0.249) !!! - 0.009 (0.022) 0.020 (0.038) 0.014 (0.150) 0.023 (0.094) !!! ∙ !"#$ - - -0.036 (0.192) -0.044 (0.060) -0.005 (0.907) 
Rec - 0.025 (0.172) 0.021 (0.251) 0.013 (0.331) -0.010 (0.671) 
GDP - -0.014 (0.753) -0.015 (0.751) -0.002 (0.947) 0.022 (0.584) 
CPI - -0.017 (0.706) -0.019 (0.678) -0.022 (0.361) 0.007 (0.858) 
FOMC - -0.079 (0.135) -0.079 (0.133) 0.008 (0.794) 0.040 (0.395) !"# ∙ !"# - 0.061 (0.33) 0.060 (0.332) -0.013 (0.719) - !"# ∙ !"# - 0.053 (0.391) 0.057 (0.356) 0.023 (0.501) - !"#$ ∙ !"# - 0.110 (0.145) 0.111 (0.141) 0.027 (0.550) - 
Pos - -0.057 (0.003) -0.049 (0.011) -0.028 (0.016) -0.009 (0.710) 
ARCH CONS. - - - 0.003 (0.000) - 
ARCH L1 - - - 0.148 (0.000) - 
ARCH L2 - - - 0.073 (0.000) - 
ARCH L3 - - - 0.121 (0.000) - 
GARCH L1 - - - 0.342 (0.000) - 
GARCH L2 - - - -0.424 (0.000) - 
GARCH L3 - - - 0.727 (0.000) - 
Regression R2 0.0193 (0.0000) 0.0247 (0.0000) 0.0278 (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0039 (0.0424) 
 
Notes: This table lists regression results from the empirical estimation. The first column is the 
model estimated by Gao, et al. (2014). The next is the model containing the untested control 
factors mentioned by Gao, et al. The third column is the unrestricted OLS model that includes 
VPIN terms. The fourth is the GARCH(3, 3) model, and the last is the model in which just the 
sign of the last half hour return is predicted. The p-values for the significance of the t-statistics 
associated with each coefficient are in parentheses. The ARCH χ2 p-value is reported in place of 
R2, and the Marginal Effects (means and sample sizes in Table 1) and Pseudo R2 are reported for 
probit model. 
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Figure 7. First Half-Hour VPIN over Time 
!!
Notes: This figure gives the distribution of VPIN over time. There is a clear structural break at 
the beginning of 2008 (denoted by the red line), after which the mean value of VPIN is clearly 
different. ! !
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Table 4. Split Sample by VPIN Trend (p-value in parenthesis) 
 1999 - 2007 2008 – 2012 
Constant 0.018 (0.491) 0.053 (0.465) !! 0.126 (0.004) 0.345 (0.000) 
VPIN -0.051 (0.392) -0.106 (0.743) !! ∙ !"#$ -0.152 (0.097) -1.210 (0.001) !!! -0.043 (0.184) 0.048 (0.213) !!! ∙ !"#$ 0.101 (0.164) -0.178 (0.423) 
Rec 0.062 (0.007) -0.009 (0.777) 
GDP 0.001 (0.988) -0.053 (0.588) 
CPI -0.082 (0.063) 0.082 (0.391) 
FOMC -0.036 (0.476) -0.161 (0.176) !"# ∙ !"# 0.051 (0.403) 0.067 (0.617) !"# ∙ !"# 0.036 (0.551) 0.114 (0.396) !"#$ ∙ !"# 0.097 (0.0187) 0.132 (0.419) 
Pos -0.020 (0.288) -0.073 (0.091) 
Regression R2 0.0198 (0.0000) 0.0490 (0.0000) 
 
Notes: This table contains the regression results from the split-sample regression. The sample is 
split at the beginning of 2008, when there is a structural break in the distribution of VPIN. The 
regression before the split is in the left column, and after the split on the right. The p-values for 
the significance of the t-statistics associated with each coefficient are in parentheses. ! !
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Table 5. Regression by VPIN Quintile (p-value in parenthesis) 
 VPIN ≥ 0.2039811 VPIN ≥ 0.2691757 VPIN ≥ 0.345115 VPIN ≥ 0.4426617 
Constant -0.003 (0.894) 0.045 (0.146) 0.029 (0.554) -0.034 (0.721) !! 0.047 (0.140) 0.125 (0.008) 0.060 (0.383) 0.277 (0.031) 
VPIN 0.030 (0.198) -0.042 (0.194) -0.055 (0.177) -0.015 (0.863) !! ∙ !"#$ 0.004 (0.940) -0.098 (0.144) -0.057 (0.566) 0.055 (0.747) !!! 0.019 (0.792) -0.151 (0.127) -0.019 (0.888) -0.398 (0.082) !!! ∙ !"#$ -0.061 (0.26) 0.102 (0.168) 0.127 (0.165) 0.065 (0.686) 
Rec 0.024 (0.196) 0.039 (0.079) 0.049 (0.093) 0.061 (0.158) 
GDP -0.040 (0.344) -0.037 (0.448) -0.023 (0.720) 0.008 (0.938) 
CPI -0.044 (0.279) -0.089 (0.045) -0.144 (0.017) -0.258 (0.015) 
FOMC -0.014 (0.774) -0.045 (0.387) -0.051 (0.433) -0.149 (0.139) !"# ∙ !"# 0.067 (0.243) 0.083 (0.192) 0.097 (0.242) 0.171 (0.186) !"# ∙ !"# 0.015 (0.791) 0.016 (0.798) 0.066 (0.419) 0.109 (0.440) !"#$ ∙ !"# 0.072 (0.303) 0.103 (0.173) 0.169 (0.081) 0.342 (0.017) 
Pos -0.019 (0.297) -0.020 (0.304) -0.038 (0.145) -0.039 (0.306) 
R2 0.0113 (0.0030) 0.0197 (0.0001) 0.0208 (0.0068) 0.0524 (0.0004) 
 
Notes: This table gives the regression results of the tests for threshold effects. Each regression 
uses the given value of VPIN at the top of the column as the threshold, as no threshold is 
immediately apparent. The p-values for the significance of the t-statistics associated with each 
coefficient are in parentheses. ! !
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Table 6. Variable Definitions and Sources 
Short Variable Name Full Variable Name Definition Source !! First Half-Hour Return The percent return of the SPY 
during the first half-hour of the 
trading day 
Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS) NYSE Trade 
and Quote (TAQ) Database !!" Last Half-Hour Return The percent return of the SPY 
during the last (13th) half-hour 
of the trading day 
WRDS NYSE TAQ Database 
VPIN First half-hour Volume-
Synchronized Probability of 
Informed Trading 
The VPIN of the SPY during the 
first half-hour of the trading day 
WRDS NYSE TAQ Database 
!!! First half-hour return, squared The percent return of the SPY 
during the first half-hour of the 
trading day, squared 
WRDS NYSE TAQ Database 
Rec Recession Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
in a recession, 0 otherwise 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER)  
GDP GDP Release Date Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
there is a GDP release on that 
day, 0 otherwise 
US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (US BEA) 
CPI CPI Release Date Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
there is a CPI release on that 
day, 0 otherwise 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(US BLS) 
FOMC FOMC Minutes Release Date Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
there is a FOMC meeting 
minutes release on that day, 0 
otherwise 
US Federal Reserve 
Pos Positive First Half-Hour Return Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the first half-hour return of the 
SPY is positive on that day, 0 
otherwise 
WRDS NYSE TAQ Database 
PS Predicted Successfully Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the sign of the last half-hour 
return is predicted successfully 
from the sign of the first half-
hour return on that day, 0 
otherwise. 
WRDS NYSE TAQ Database 
 
Notes: This table contains all of the variables that are used in this study, as well as their 
definitions and sources. 
